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Surrogate Optimal Control for Strategic Multi-Agent Systems
Pedro Hespanhol and Anil Aswani
Abstract—This paper studies how to design a platform to
optimally control constrained multi-agent systems with a single
coordinator and multiple strategic agents. In our setting, the
agents cannot apply control inputs and only the coordinator
applies control inputs; however, the coordinator does not know
the objective functions of the agents, and so must choose control
actions based on information provided by the agents. One major
challenge is that if the platform is not correctly designed then
the agents may provide false information to the coordinator
in order to achieve improved outcomes for themselves at the
expense of the overall system efficiency. Here, we design an
interaction mechanism between the agents and the coordinator
such that the mechanism: ensures agents truthfully report their
information, has low communication requirements, and leads
to a control action that achieves efficiency by achieving a Nash
equilibrium. In particular, we design a mechanism in which
each agent does not need to posses full knowledge of the
system dynamics nor the objective functions of other agents.
We illustrate our proposed mechanism in a model predictive
control (MPC) application involving heating, ventilation, air-
conditioning (HVAC) control by a buildingmanager of an apart-
ment building. Our results showcase how such a mechanism can
be potentially used in the context of distributed MPC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many systems have dynamics influenced by agents, in-
cluding power systems [1], communication networks [2], wa-
ter systems [3], and heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
(HVAC) automation [4]. These systems are characterized by
information flows and the order of computations. For coop-
erative agents, various distributed model predictive control
(MPC) schemes have been designed. A system-level control
policy was obtained by aggregating locally-computed inputs
[5], [6], and central platforms that compute a control based
upon information sent by agents have also been designed [7].
Distributed control with strategic agents is less well-
studied. The competitive nature of agents and asymmetries
of information reward tactical behavior, ultimately leading
to instability or poor performance [8]–[11]. We focus our
attention on the case where equilibrium behavior can be
described as a Nash equilibrium of some non-cooperative
game [12] that may be inefficient [13]. A common way to
overcome such inefficiencies is to force agents to coordinate
their goals with the system-wide goal [14], [15]. However,
this approach requires strong assumptions that the agents’
utility functions are common knowledge and/or agents are
honest when transmitting information [16]. Another line
of work [17], [18] provides pricing schemes to induce or
manage agents’ behavior in the equilibrium.
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A. Contributions
In this paper, we study the case of strategic agents under
weaker assumptions than past work like [16], [19]. In par-
ticular, the agents exchange information only with a central
platform that is responsible for the control decision. Our
goal is to design the interaction mechanism to ensure not
only efficiency of the resulting control policy but also honest
reporting from the agents. Originally, the study of such
mechanisms [20] was concerned with the design of incentives
to ensure efficient allocation of commodities amongst market
participants, whilst ensuring truthfulness. The classical VCG
mechanisms [21]–[23] are an example of such. Our first
contribution lies in providing a mechanism that enjoy those
properties when applied to an optimal control setting.
A major hurdle in implementing such mechanisms is their
steep communication needs [11], [24], [25]. But, minimal
strategy spaces that elicit efficient Nash equilibrium in con-
vex environments have been developed [26]. A second con-
tribution of our work is to provide communication protocols
that are of low complexity order: We avoid communicating
the entire utility function by the agents and instead resort to
vector-valued messages inspired by surrogate optimization
[24], [27]. Hence, our goal in this paper is to provide a plat-
form where (i) agents provide low-dimensional information,
(ii) agents are honest, and (iii) an efficient control policy is
implemented in the Nash equilibrium.
Lastly, we demonstrate the practical usefulness of our
designed platform by conducting a simulation analysis of
HVAC automation [28]. The situation we consider involves
an apartment building where each apartment has its own
preferences on desired room temperature versus the amount
of energy consumption. The thermal dynamics of each
apartment are coupled, and more efficient control is possible
through coordination. Our simulations quantify the perfor-
mance improvement possible through the use of our central
platform in coordinating agents. In fact, this HVAC setup is
similar to the setup in [18]. However, a major difference is
that in [18] the central platform knows each agents’ utility
function and can set prices on the control inputs to induce
agents’ behavior. In contrast, we allow the agents to be
strategic with respect to how they communicate information
about their utility function to the central platform.
B. Outline
Sect. II defines the system model, and Sect. III defines the
mechanism and how agents interact with it. In Sect. IV, we
provide a Nash equilibrium characterization of the agents’
equilibrium behavior. We conclude with Sect. V, where we
provide a case study in the context of HVAC automation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system which obeys linear dynamics
xk+1 = Axk +Buk (1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector, and uk ∈ Rm is the input
signal. Suppose this system is composed of I interconnected
and non-overlapping subsystems that are each associated to
an agent. Let [I] denote the set {0, ..., I}. We let x
(i)
k ∈ R
ni
denote the state vector of subsystem i at period k. Then we
have xk = (x
(1)
k , ..., x
(I)
k ) and
∑I
i=1 ni = n. In addition,
we can also partition the inputs where u
(i)
k ∈ R
mi . Note it
follows that uk = (u
(1)
k , ..., u
(I)
k ) and
∑I
i=1 mi = m.
A. Agent Model
The diagonal blockAii ofA gives the subsystem dynamics
for the i-th agent. Influence by other agents is described by
off-diagonal blocks Aij of A when subsystem j impacts
i. We assume agent i’s input only affects states in their
subsystem; hence, the input matrix B = diag(B1, ..., BI) is
block-diagonal. Let Ni be the set of neighboring subsystems
of subsystem i. Then the dynamics for the i-th subsystem is
x
(i)
k+1 = Aiix
(i)
k +Biu
(i)
k +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijx
(j)
k . (2)
We assume each agent only knows their own local dynamics
Aii and Bi. Since agents do not know the
∑
j∈Ni
Aijx
(j)
k
part of their dynamics, a central platform is needed through
which each agent can receive this information.
Each subsystem has state Xi = {G
(i)
x x(i) ≤ g
(i)
x } and
input constraints Ui = {G
(i)
u u(i) ≤ g
(i)
u } that are polytopes
containing the origin. Here, {G
(i)
x , G
(i)
u }Ii=1, {g
(i)
x , g
(i)
u }Ii=1
are matrices and vectors with appropriate dimensions, re-
spectively. Lastly, each agent i has their own cost function
Vi(x
(i), u(i))) = gi(x
(i)
T ) +
∑T−1
k=0 li(x
(i)
k , u
(i)
k ) (3)
where li(·, ·) and gi(·) are stage and terminal costs, and
T is control horizon. We assume each agent’s stage and
terminal costs are strictly convex, differentiable, and take
their minimum at the origin. The cost function is the agents’
private information, and their goal is to minimize it.
B. Principal Model
The central platform is operated by a coordinator that we
call the principal. We assume the principal has complete
knowledge about the dynamics of the system (i.e., matrices
A and B) and constraints (i.e., the sets Xi,Ui, ∀i ∈ [I]),
and importantly the principal is who gets to apply a control
input to the entire system (restated, the agents do not directly
provide control inputs). In this framework, if the principal
knew the objective function of each agent, then they could
compute a control sequence by solving the following convex
optimal control problem (OCP-T):
min
x,u
∑M
i=1(gi(x
(i)
T ) +
∑T−1
k=0 li(x
(i)
k , u
(i)
k ))
s.t. xk+1 = Axk +Buk, ∀k ∈ [T − 1]
x
(i)
k ∈ Xi, u
(i)
k ∈ Ui, ∀i ∈ [I], k ∈ [T ]
x
(i)
0 = x¯
(i)
0 , ∀i ∈ [I]
(4)
Throughout the paper we let (x∗, u∗) denote the optimal
solution of (OCP-T), which we call the efficient trajectory.
However, solving this problem is not possible for the prin-
cipal, since it does not know the objective functions of each
agent. It then needs to elicit information from each agent.
The need of information gives birth to two major issues,
which are the central focus of this work: (1) The agents may
not be able/not desire to transmit their entire cost functions
to the principal, as each cost function is infinite-dimensional
and their private information; (2) The agents are strategic and
may be not tell the truth. Therefore in order for the principal
to solve (OCP-T) it also needs to design a mechanism that
provides incentives to each agent to tell the truth. Hence, the
principal is faced with both an optimal control problem and
a mechanism design problem.
III. MECHANISM SPECIFICATION
As described in the previous section, the principal’s goal
is to solve (OCP-T). Towards that goal, the principal resorts
to approximate the objective function based on a finite
number of parameters that the agents can report, and then
the principal will minimize this approximated function.
A. Definition of a Mechanism
Let a mechanism M be a tuple (M1, ...,MI , z, p), where
Mi is the set of allowable messages agent i can send
to the principal, and z(·) is the outcome function that
determines the outcome z(m) for any message profile m =
(m1, ...,mI) ∈ M1 × ... ×MI . Here, the outcome function
maps a message profile m to a state/input trajectory (x, u):
z(m) : (M1 × ...×MI)→ R
n×(T+1) × Rm×T (5)
where zi(m) refers to the state/input trajectory associated
with agent’s i subsystem. Next, we define p(m) to be a non-
negative vector of “fees” for each agent.
The mechanism M together with the cost functions of
each agents (Vi)
I
i=1 induce a game N = (M, (Vi)
I
i=1)
among the agents. We define the Nash equilibrium (NE) of
this game as a message profile m∗ such that
Vi(zi(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i)) + pi(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i) ≤
Vi(zi(mi,m
∗
−i)) + pi(mi,m
∗
−i), (6)
for allmi ∈Mi and i ∈ [I], where the compact notationm∗−i
denotes the vector of messages from all agents except i. The
fee pi increases costs for agent i, which is undesirable since
agents are minimizing. The goal of the principal is to design
the mechanism such that the efficient trajectory (x∗, u∗) can
be implemented as the Nash equilibrium of the game N.
Implementation means that the trajectory corresponding to
the Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism
is equal to the efficient trajectory.
B. Low-Communication Mechanism
We specify our low-communication mechanism as fol-
lows: Each agent i reports messages mi ∈Mi of the form
mi = (v
(i), w(i), λ˜i, J˜ (i), x˜(i)) (7)
where v(i) ∈ Rni×(T+1) are weights for every state of
subsystem i for each stage; w(i) ∈ Rmi×T are weights
for every control input of subsystem i for each stage;
λ˜i ∈ Rni×T are weights representing the “sensitivity” of
agent i dynamics in cost function for each stage; J˜ (i) =
({x
(i)
k , x¯
(i)
k }
T
k=0, {u
(i)
k , u¯
(i)
k }
T
k=0) is vector of bounds for
states/inputs; and x˜(i) = (x˜
(i)
0 , ..., x˜
(i)
T ) is a reference tra-
jectory for the states of subsystem i. Restated, each agent
provides some open-loop trajectory coupled with state and
input bounds, as well as scalars measuring the “impact” of
states, inputs, and dynamics in its cost function.
In addition, the principal announces a single real-valued
function f : R×R→ R to all agents to be used as a surrogate
function for their cost functions. Namely, for each agent i
the principal forms the surrogate function
fi(v
(i)
k , w
(i)
k , x
(i)
k , u
(i)
k ) =∑mi
j=1(f(x
(i)
j,k; v
(i)
j,k) + f(u
(i)
j,k;w
(i)
j,k)) for k ∈ [T − 1] (8)
as an approximation of the agent’s stage cost li(·, ·). The
notation f(·; ·) indicates the second argument is a parameter
of the function and not a variable. We further only consider
functions f(·; v) that are strictly convex for all possible
parameters v ∈ R. Lastly, for simplicity we let the principal
announce the same function for both states and inputs. But
one could consider different functions for states and inputs
– the key property being that it is the same function for all
agents. Then the principal forms the surrogate function
Fi(v(i)T , x
(i)
T ) =
∑mi
j=1 f(x
(i)
j,T ; v
(i)
j,T ) (9)
as an approximation of agent’s terminal cost gi(·). Based on
a message profile m, the principal formulates the following
surrogate optimal control problem (OCP-S):
min
x,u
I∑
i=1
(Fi(v(i)T , x
(i)
T ) +
T−1∑
k=0
fi(v
(i)
k , w
(i)
k , x
(i)
k , u
(i)
k ))
s.t. xk+1 = Axk +Buk, ∀k ∈ [T − 1]
x
(i)
k ∈ Xi, u
(i)
k ∈ Ui, ∀i ∈ [I], k ∈ [T ]
(x
(i)
k , u
(i)
k ) ∈ J˜
(i)
k , ∀k ∈ [T ]
x
(i)
0 = x¯
(i)
0 , ∀i ∈ [I]
(10)
where we explicitly consider the desired operational bounds
reported by each agent J˜
(i)
k for every stage k.
Since f is strictly convex, this optimization problem has
an unique solution that we call (x(y∗), y∗). Note that this
notation means the y∗ are the optimal inputs for OCP-S.
Then, given a message profile m, we have that z(m) =
(x(y∗), y∗). That is, the outcome function of the mechanism
z(m) outputs exactly the state/input trajectory of the optimal
solution of OCP-S. We also define λ∗(i) to be the optimal
lagrange multipliers associated with Eq. 2 for every agent i.
Now, suppose the game is repeatedly played with the same
initial condition x¯0. At first, this mechanism is run for one
round, meaning the principal collected some messagem, and
solved OCP-S once. Then, before the next round the principal
sends the following reference trajectory c(i) to agent i:
c
(i)
k =
∑
j∈Ni
Aij x˜
(j)
k (11)
for k ∈ [T − 1], where x˜(j) is part of the message mj as per
(7). Observe that the reference trajectory sent to agent i does
not depend upon solving OCP-S. Moreover the principal will
assign the following fees to each agent:
pi =
T−1∑
k=0
Λ⊤−i,k(x
(i)
k (y
∗)− xˆ
(i)
k (c
(i))) +
||x˜(i) − x(i)(y∗)||22 + ||λ˜
(i) − λ∗(i)||22 (12)
where xˆ(i)(c(i)) is a state reference trajectory computed
by the principal for agent i given that the other agents
behave according to c(i). For example, the principal can
solve another round of OCP-S but now excluding agent
i’s contribution to the objective function in order to obtain
xˆ(i)(c(i)) (in a way akin to VCG mechanisms [23]). The
key observation here is that the reference trajectory xˆ(i)(c(i))
does not depend on the message sent by agent i. The first
term of the fee penalizes deviations of the computed optimal
state trajectory x(i)(y∗) from xˆ(i)(c(i)). The second term
penalizes mismatches between the reported x˜(i) and the
optimal state trajectory x(i)(y∗). The third term penalizes
deviations from the reported sensitivity vector λ˜(i) and
the optimal lagrange multipliers λ∗(i) of OCP-S associated
with the dynamics of agent i. Lastly the vectors Λ−i,k are
computed by the principal as follows:
Λ⊤−i,k =
∑
j:i∈Nj
λ˜
(j)⊤
k Aji, ∀k ∈ [T − 1] (13)
where we, once again, note that this vector does not
depend on the message sent by agent i.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION
With the mechanism defined, we can now characterize the
equilibrium behavior of agents interacting via this mecha-
nism. The goal of this section is to characterize the Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the reulting game, which is a message
profile m∗. We start by first analyzing the properties of such
equilibrium, and then we show it actually exists. Our analysis
begins by showing that in a NE m∗, each agent i reports a
specific type of state reference trajectories to the principal.
Lemma 1: Let m∗ = (v∗, w∗, λ˜∗, J˜∗, x˜∗) be a NE of the
game induced by the mechanism. Then every agent i ∈ I
reports x˜(i)∗ = x(i)(y∗) and λ˜(i)∗ = λ(i)∗. In addition, the
principal sends the following references to the agents:
c
∗(i)
k =
∑
j∈Ni
Aijx
(j)
k (y
∗), ∀k ∈ [T − 1] (14)
Proof: Suppose all agents adhere to the message profile
m∗, except agent i which reports some message mi =
(v(i), w∗(i), λ˜(i), J∗(i), x˜(i)). Sincem∗ is a NE, this deviation
should give a higher cost for agent i, that is:
Vi(zi(mi,m
∗
−i)) + pi(mi,m
∗
−i) ≥
Vi(zi(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i)) + pi(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i). (15)
Now, observe that the outcome function z(m) only depends
on the (v∗, w∗, J˜∗) components of the message m∗. Then
substituting into (12) gives that
||λ˜(i) − λ∗(i)||22 + ||x˜
(i) − x(i)(y∗))||22
≥ ||λ˜∗(i) − λ∗(i)||22 + ||x˜
∗(i) − x(i)(y∗))||22 (16)
for all possible sensitivities and state trajectory reports
(λ˜(i), x˜(i)). Hence (λ˜∗(i), x˜∗(i)) is the solution of the fol-
lowing minimization problem:
min
(λ˜∗(i),x˜∗(i))
{||λ˜(i) − λ∗(i)||22 + ||x˜
(i) − x(i)(y∗)||22} (17)
which achieves the minimum when (λ˜∗(i), x˜∗(i)) =
(λ∗(i)x(i)(y∗)). Then by definition of c(i) it directly follows
that
c
∗(i)
k =
∑
j∈Ni
Aijx
(j)
k (y
∗), ∀k ∈ [T − 1] (18)
Next, observe that each agent can only “measure” the
impact of other subsystems in its dynamics via the reference
signal c(i) that is sent by the principal. We say an state/input
sequence (xˇ(i), uˇ(i)) is feasible for agent i if it is feasible for
the agent’s subsystem given the reference c(i). We proceed
to show that given the reference c(i), any feasible state/input
sequence (xˇ(i), uˇ(i)) can be achieved by agent i. That is,
agent i can send a message that makes the principal compute
the input y∗(i) = uˇ(i) and x(i)(y∗) = xˇ(i) as it solves the
problem OCP-S, given that OCP-S is feasible.
Lemma 2: For any agent i, given a feasible state/input
sequence (xˇ(i), uˇ(i)) there exists a message m¯i such that
zi(m¯i,m−i) = (xˇ
(i), uˇ(i)) for all possible messages of
the other agents m−i, given that the resulting optimization
problem (OCP-S) is feasible for (m¯i,m−i).
Proof: Fix some agent i and a feasible state/input
sequence (xˇ(i), uˇ(i)). We prove this lemma by constructing
the message m¯i. Specifically, suppose agent i chooses x
(i)
k =
x¯
(i)
k = xˇ
(i)
k and u
(i)
k = u¯
(i)
k = uˇ
(i)
k . This choice constrains
OCP-S to require that y∗(i) = uˇ(i) and x(i)(y∗) = xˇ(i). Then
for any message m−i, OCP-S is either infeasible or returns
the desired solution for agent i, regardless of the message of
other agents.
What this lemma implies is that given the Nash equilib-
rium message profile m∗, agent i can unilaterally deviate in
such a way that the principal will compute (xˇ(i), uˇ(i)) as
part of the optimal solution, as long as OCP-S is feasible.
We proceed in writing the agent’s optimal control problem
(OCP-A) in equilibrium:
min
x(i),u(i)
gi(x
(i)
T ) +
∑T−1
k=0 li(x
(i)
k , u
(i)
k ) + p
∗
i (x
(i))
s.t. x
(i)
k+1 = Aiix
(i)
k +Biu
(i)
k + c
∗(i)
k , ∀k ∈ [T − 1]
x
(i)
k ∈ Xi, u
(i)
k ∈ Ui, ∀k ∈ [T ]
x
(i)
0 = x¯
(i)
0
(19)
where the equilibrium fee, according to Lemmas 1 and 2 is
given by:
p∗i (x
(i)) =
T−1∑
k=0
Λ∗⊤−i,k(x
(i)
k − xˆ
(i)
k (c
(i))) (20)
where Λ∗⊤−i,k =
∑
j:i∈Nj
λ
∗(j)⊤
k Aji, ∀k ∈ [T − 1].
Thus in order for a message profile m∗ to be a NE, we
must have that the optimal solution (x(y∗), y∗) for OCP-
S must also be an optimal solution for each agents’ OCP-
A. Since both OCP-S and OCP-A are convex problems, it
is enough to require that (x∗(i)(y∗), y∗(i)) satisfy the KKT
conditions for OCP-A for every agent i. Next we present
our main theorem, which shows that the efficient trajectory
(x∗, u∗) can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium of the
game induced by the mechanism:
Theorem 1: (Implementability): The unique efficient
trajectory can be supported as a Nash equilibrium m∗ of
the game induced by the mechanism, that is (x(y∗), y∗) =
(x∗, u∗). In addition the equilibrium messages satisfy
f ′(x
∗(i)
j,k ; v
∗(i)
j,k ) =
∂li(x
∗(i)
k , u
∗(i)
k )
∂x
(i)
j,k
, ∀i, j, k
f ′(x
∗(i)
j,T ; v
∗(i)
j,T ) =
∂gi(x
∗(i)
T )
∂x
(i)
j,T
, ∀i, j
f ′(u
∗(i)
h,k ;w
∗(i)
h,k ) =
∂li(x
∗(i)
k , u
∗(i)
k )
∂u
(i)
h,k
, ∀i, h, k
x˜i = x∗(i), λ˜i = λ∗(i) ∀i
J˜ (i) = ({−∞,+∞}Tk=0, {−∞,+∞}
T
k=0), ∀i
(21)
where f ′(·) denotes the derivative of f(·).
Proof: First, note OCP-T is an “aggregation” of each
agent’s problem: Instead of optimizing each agent separately
with references c(i) for the neighbors, we optimize all agents
at once. The KKT stationarity conditions for multipliers
(ν, γx, γu) of OCP-T, associated with the dynamics, state
and input constraints respectively, are
∂li(x
∗(i)
k
,u
∗(i)
k
)
∂x
(i)
j,k
+ ν
(i)⊤
k Aii,j − ν
(i)
k−1,j+
γ
(i)⊤
x G
(i)
x,j,k +
∑
ℓ∈Ni
ν
(ℓ)⊤
k Aℓi,j = 0
∂gi(x
∗(i)
T
)
∂x
(i)
j,k
− ν
(i)
T−1,j + γ
(i)⊤
x G
(i)
x,j,T = 0
∂li(x
∗(i)
k
,u
∗(i)
k
)
∂u
(i)
h,k
+ ν
(i)⊤
k Bii,h + γ
(i)⊤
u G
(i)
u,h,k = 0
(22)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ni}, h ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} and k ∈ {1, ..., T −
1}. On the above we use the notation Ali,j to denote the
column j of matrix Ali. In addition we let Bii,h denote the
column h of Bii. Similarly, G·,j,k represents the column j
of the stage k constraints matrix G·,k. Now, if the messages
follow (21), then it is easy to see that (x∗, u∗) satisfy the
KKT conditions of OCP-S:
f ′(x
∗(i)
j,k ; v
∗(i)
j,k ) + λ
(i)⊤
k Aii,j − λ
(i)⊤
k−1,j+
β(i)⊤x G
(i)
x,j,k +
∑
ℓ∈Ni
λ
(ℓ)⊤
k Aℓi,j = 0
f ′(x
∗(i)
j,T ; v
∗(i)
j,T )− λ
(i)
T−1,j + β
(i)⊤
x G
(i)
x,j,T = 0
f ′(u
∗(i)
h,k ;w
∗(i)
h,k ) + λ
(i)⊤
k Bii,h + β
(i)⊤
u G
(i)
u,h,k = 0
(23)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ni}, h ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, k ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}
and for λ = ν, γx = βx and γu = βu. But in the equilibrium,
Lemma 1 says that the reference trajectory c∗(i) sent to each
agent is exactly the one that would be obtained if each agent
applied the input sequent y∗(i). Hence (x∗, u∗) solves, not
only OCP-S, but also each agent’s problem when c∗(i) is sent
to the agents (OCP-A). This can be seen directly by using the
multipliers λ(i), γ
(i)
x and γ
(i)
u for every agent’s subproblem
and verifying that (x∗(i), u∗(i)) solves the KKT conditions
of OCP-A. As a result, no agent has incentive to deviate
from m∗i . Hence m
∗ will be a Nash equilibrium of the game
induced by the mechanism.
We finish this section with some remarks on Theorem 1:
At equilibrium, each agent reports the largest possible
bounds J˜∗(i) so that OCP-S is always feasible at equilibrium.
One may argue why do we include such reports in the
message vector? Their presence is key to establishing Lemma
2, as they provide a “credible threat” to the mechanism
(and thus to other agents). This forces that the solution
(x(y∗), y∗) of OCP-S must solve each agent’s subproblem at
equilibrium. A similar argument with a numerical example
is given in [25] in the context of routing. Also, each agent
reports weights such that the derivative of the surrogate
function f matches exactly their marginal cost with respect
to states and inputs. Secondly, observe that the fees payed
in equilibrium are not zero, as they depend on the reference
trajectory sent by the mechanism. The intuition behind this
is that the fee charged to agent i can capture the “exter-
nality” cost it imposes to the system by having his cost
function considered by the mechanism. Lastly, OCP-S may
be infeasible outside of equilibrium, since an agent could
report an infeasible operational range. This issue can be
overcome by assuming that the principal may apply some
feasible control input if OCP-S ends up being infeasible.
More importantly, in order for the agents to behave according
to the equilibrium strategies, they need to know the optimal
solution (x∗, u∗) for OCP-T. This means that the agents need
to “learn” the equilibrium by replaying the game and refining
their messages. In the next section, we will provide one such
simple learning process and, instead of theoretically proving
its convergence to the Nash equilibrium defined in Theorem
1, we will present a test case on HVAC control in an MPC
setting, where the game is replayed consecutively, but at each
time, the initial condition x¯0 is different. This showcases the
potential use of our mechanism when a learning protocol is
used within the MPC framework.
V. HVAC CONTROL CASE STUDY
Consider a building manager who controls the HVAC
system for four rooms. Each room occupant is an agent. Let
Tk = [T
1
k , T
2
k , T
3
k , T
4
k ]
⊤ the state be the room temperatures.
The building manager can heat/cool each individual room:
Let uk = [u
1
k, u
2
k, u
3
k, u
4
k]
⊤ be the inputs in each room. Fig.
2 shows the layout of the rooms with respect to each other.
Using standard HVAC models [29], the dynamics are
Tk+1 =


ρ1 −β −γ 0
−β ρ2 0 η
−γ 0 ρ3 −ν
0 −η −ν ρ4

Tk+µuk−α


T outk
T outk
T outk
T outk

 (24)
where ρ1 = 1 + α + β + γ; ρ2 = 1 + α + β + η; ρ3 =
1 + α + γ + ν; ρ4 = 1 + α + η + ν; and β, γ, η, ν are the
heat transmission coefficients between rooms; and α is the
heat coefficient with the outside. In addition, µ is the heat
coefficient between the HVAC and each room. Note we treat
the outside temperature as an exogenous disturbance vector.
Now suppose each agent has the private cost function
Vi(x
(i), u(i)) = λi2
∑N−1
k=0 (T
i
k−T
i
d)
2+ (1−λi)2 e
(γiu
i
k)
2
(25)
where the tuple (T id, λi, γi) is the agent’s private informa-
tion, namely: their desired room temperate and two scalars
regulating the trade-off between comfort and energy usage.
Following the setup of our mechanism, the building manager
does not know the agent’s private information nor the shape
of their objective functions. The manager broadcasts the
function f(T i, ui; v, w) = 12 (e − vTr)
2 + 12 (wu)
2, where
Tr is a reference temperature for the building manager.
We consider an MPC setting, where the principal’s reced-
ing horizon OCP-S at stage t is given by
min 12
∑N−1
k=0
∑I
i=1(T
i
t+k|t − v
(i)
t+k|tTr)
2 + (w
(i)
t+k|tu
i
t+k|t)
2
s.t. Tt+k+1|t = ATt+k|t +But+k|t + bt+k|t, ∀k ∈ [T − 1]
(T
(i)
t+k|tu
(i)
t+k|t) ∈ J˜
(i)
t , ∀k ∈ [N − 1] (26)
umin ≤ u
(i)
t+k|t ≤ umax, ∀i ∈ [I], k ∈ [T − 1]
T
(i)
t|t = Tt , ∀i ∈ [I]
where A,B are given in (24) and bt+k|t is a prediction of
−αT outt+k made at time t. Also, we use u
(i)
t+k|t to denote the
open-loop control input computed at stage t. Let (T ∗t , u
∗
t ) be
the optimal solution of (26). The manager uses the current
open-loop trajectories sent by agents to compute references
c
(i)
t+k|t =
∑
i∈Ni
Aij T˜
(j)
t+k|t, ∀k ∈ [T − 1] (27)
where the neighborhoodsNi match the room configurations.
The principal also uses T
∗(i)
t in order to compute the refer-
ence trajectory in the fee pi. After receiving such references,
each agent solves their own OCP-A with the computed
fees pi in the objective, obtaining a private solution vector
(Tˆ
(i)
t , uˆ
(i)
t ) and setting λ˜
(i)
t to be the lagrange multipliers
associated with the dynamics. Then each agent updates the
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Fig. 1. Closed-Loop State Trajectories for (blue x-marked dashed line) P-MPC: Perfect Information Case; (red circle-marked dotted line) M-MPC:
Surrogate-Mechanism Case; and (black dot-marked solid line) A-MPC: Consensus-Average Case
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Fig. 2. Room Configuration with Heat Exchange Vectors highlighted
remaining according to (21), which in our case reduces to
vit+k|t = ((1 − λi)Tˆ
i
t+k|t + T
i
d)/Tr
wit+k|t =
√
(1 − λi)γ2i e
(γiuˆt+k|t)2
(28)
Lastly, J˜
(i)
t = ({−∞,+∞}
T
k=0, {−∞,+∞}
T
k=0) and
T˜ it+1 = Tˆ
(i)
t . When t = 0, all weights are initialized to
unit values. All optimization problems were solved using
the optimization solver MOSEK [30]. We consider a optimal
control length T = 5 and an MPC horizon of N = 15.
We compare our mechanism-based MPC (M-MPC) with
the perfect-information case (P-MPC), where the principal
knows the exact form of each Vi. We also consider a
“consensus”-type case, where no weights are updated and
Tr is set to the average of the desired temperatures (A-
MPC). Fig. 1 shows the closed-loop state trajectory of the
three approaches. It shows that our M-MPC closely tracks
the P-MPC trajectory. Note that disturbance from the outside
temperature causes the room temperatures to fluctuate around
the desired values.
Fig. 3 shows M-MPC recovers the P-MPC cost after a
few time steps. Since we used true costs to compute P-MPC,
this shows our mechanism recovers the efficient trajectory.
In contrast, the case without information exchange behaves
poorly. This example shows our mechanism can be used with
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Fig. 3. MPC Aggregated Stage Cost with Agents’ True Utility Functions
MPC: at each stage an optimal control problem is solved,
the first-stage control is applied, and agents update their
messages based on knowledge received from the principal.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied a dynamical system with several non-
cooperative strategic agents. We proposed a mechanism
where the agents interact via a platform and characterized
the equilibrium strategies. We provided an HVAC control
test case to highlight the need of designing mechanisms that
have low-communication requirements in an MPC setting.
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